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‘For the Times they Are A-Changin’: Explaining 
Voting Patterns of U.S. Supreme Court Justices 
through Identification of Micro-Publics 
Jeff Yates, Justin Moeller & Brian Levey* 
Abstract 
In assessing how social forces may shape U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ 
decision-making it has been presumed that there is a singular public opinion 
and that this opinion affects each individual Justice in largely the same fash-
ion. We suggest that it is more likely the case that Justices’ world views are 
informed and shaped by a myriad of social concerns and group identities upon 
which the Justices structure and process their experiences and develop and re-
fine their personal schemas. While some have already begun to question the 
proposition of a monolithic public opinion influence on judicial behavior and 
have begun to think carefully about what we term the “micro-publics” that 
may inform Supreme Court Justices’ decision-making, the more tangible 
questions of whether Justices respond to publics that are distinguishable from 
broad-based national public opinion and what those micro-publics might be 
remain largely unanswered. Our study focuses on the potential influence of 
localized and personal micro-publics and the possibility of partisan-based elite 
influence on judicial behavior. We test our hypotheses by analyzing the voting 
record of Supreme Court Justices on civil liberties cases from 1977 to 2003 
and find encouraging initial support for our theory. 
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Come senators, congressmen 
Please heed the call 
Don’t stand in the doorway 
Don’t block up the hall 
For he that gets hurt 
Will be he who has stalled 
There’s a battle outside 
And it is ragin’. 
It’ll soon shake your windows 
And rattle your walls 
For the times they are a-changin’. 
– Bob Dylan1 
 
I. Introduction 
During the hearings following his nomination to the Supreme 
Court by President Richard Nixon, Harry Blackmun reflected that 
“judges, even Supreme Court Justices, are human, and I suppose atti-
tudes change as we go along.”2 His comment certainly seems prescient 
as both critics and supporters of his jurisprudential decision-making 
largely agree that the ideological tenor of his voting drifted in a liberal 
direction during his tenure on the Court. But ideological drift on the 
Court actually involves a fairly broad array of Justices and, as Epstein 
and her associates demonstrate, such ideological drift reveals itself in 
Justice voting patterns that, over time, shift to the right as well as to 
 
 
 1.  BOB DYLAN, The Times They Are A-Changin’, on THE TIMES THEY ARE A-CHANGIN’ 
(Sony BMG Music Entertainment 1964). 
 2.  Theodore W. Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judicial Preference 
Change, 70 Mo. L. Rev. 1209, 1209–10 (2005) (citing Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
on the nomination of Harry A. Blackmun of Minn., to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
United States, 91st Cong. 43 (1970) (statement of Harry Blackmun)). 
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the left.3 Epstein et al.’s documentation of such trends in Justices’ vot-
ing run counter to traditional accounts of judicial behavior which have  
long held that Justices’ ideological preferences and voting behavior are 
largely stable over time.4 
The prospect that Justices’ ideological preferences (at least as re-
vealed in their patterns of case voting) are not that stable but are rather, 
consistent with Blackmun’s candid statement, apt to change over time, 
prompts us to begin thinking about what forces might precipitate such 
fluidity in judicial behavior. Research by Baum5 suggests that Justices, 
as human decision makers, are influenced by their relevant “audi-
ences.” He explains that Supreme Court Justices, like anyone else, live 
in a world of personal interactions and social engagements and, ac-
cordingly, their attitudes and actions on the Court are likely to reflect 
that set of relevant social references, at least to some degree. 
The proposition that Justices take into account and draw upon 
concerns that are external to their existing ideology or relevant legal 
considerations in deciding cases is not new. Indeed, one of the more 
prominent threads of study in judicial politics concerns the question of 
whether Justices decide cases in a manner that is generally responsive 
to majoritarian preferences.6 While, on balance, this literature indi-
cates that Justices of the Supreme Court are in fact responsive to na-
tional public opinion in their decision-making, the exact causal mech-
anism for this influence has not been clearly established or agreed 
upon. The dominant view appears to be that Justices react to public 
opinion strategically and, therefore, tend not to veer too far from ma-
joritarian preferences in their decision-making in order to amass and 
 
 3.  See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, 
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (tracking the ideological voting of U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices over time). 
 4.  See generally Lee Epstein et al., Do Political Preferences Change? A Longitudinal Study of 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 60 J. POL. 801 (1998) (assessing whether Justices’ voting is static over 
the course of their careers on the High Court). 
 5.  See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE 
ON JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (2006) (suggesting that judges are concerned with personal peer groups 
when making legal policy). 
 6.  See, e.g., William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, The Supreme Court as a Counterma-
joritarian Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions, 87 AM. POL. SCI. 
REV. 87 (1993) (providing empirical evidence that Justices vote in a majoritarian manner). 
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maintain a reservoir of good will with the public—so as to protect the 
legitimacy, independence, and vitality of the Court as a political insti-
tution.7 Baum argues that for a number of reasons this explanation for 
Supreme Court responsiveness is rather untenable and posits a largely 
ignored alternative possibility: that Justices typically decide cases in a 
manner generally congruent with the tenor of public opinion because 
they, like most people, simply seek approval and want to be well 
thought of, both in their daily lives and in how history judges them.8 
This proposition is well supported by the lessons learned from social 
psychology and established theories concerning individual self-esteem, 
how individuals organize and process information, and the structuring 
of individuals’ belief systems.9 Of course, these two ostensibly compet-
ing pathways of influence are actually by no means mutually exclusive; 
both could be casting an important influence on Justices’ thought and 
decision processes in case voting. Justices could act as strategic players 
who wish to preserve institutional legitimacy capital while simultane-
ously, and perhaps unwittingly, they are being conditioned by the so-
cial interactions, events, and stimuli that inform their daily lives. 
Bob Dylan’s famous song lyrics, set forth at the beginning of this 
paper, admonished government actors to heed the rapidly changing 
tide of “the times.” However, assessing “the times” for a particular in-
dividual, or set of individuals, can be a deceptively complex endeavor. 
For example, consider the differences, in both degree and kind, of the 
social forces and opinions that might influence a person living in 
Berkeley, California in the 1960s versus those impacting a citizen re-
siding in Jackson, Mississippi during the same time period. Are “the 
times” the same for these individuals? Do nationally based public opin-
ion estimates of “the times” accurately reflect either person’s set of rel-
evant experiences or social influences? In assessing how the social 
forces of public opinion shape Supreme Court Justices’ decision-mak-
ing, scholars have traditionally considered public opinion as somewhat 
 
 7.  See LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998); Robert A. 
Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 
279 (1957). 
 8.  See BAUM, supra note 5, at 66. 
 9.  See, e.g., Pamela Johnston Conover & Stanley Feldman, How People Organize the Po-
litical World: A Schematic Model, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 95 (1984). 
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of a monolith. In other words, it has been presumed that there is one, 
singular public opinion and that it affects the individual Justices in 
largely the same fashion. On this point, we disagree with the vast ma-
jority of existing judicial politics literature written on this matter. We 
believe that it is more likely the case that Justices’ world views are in-
formed and shaped by a myriad of social concerns and group identities 
upon which these individuals structure and process their experiences 
and develop and refine their personal schemas.10 
While some have already begun to question the proposition of a 
monolithic public opinion influence on judicial behavior11 and have 
begun to think carefully about what we term the “micro-publics” that 
may inform Supreme Court Justices’ decision-making, the more tan-
gible questions of whether Justices respond to publics that are distin-
guishable from broad-based national public opinion and what those 
micro-publics might be, remains largely unanswered. In this paper we 
offer useful insights toward addressing this important puzzle in judicial 
decision-making by providing a direct empirical test of the proposition 
that Justices are influenced by social groups or micro-publics with 
which they identify in their case voting decisions. 
Our study unfolds in the following manner: in the next section of 
this paper we briefly examine the existing literature on how Justices 
respond to external cues or influences and develop our theory of mi-
cro-publics’ influence on judicial decision-making. In the section that 
follows, we set forth our approach and outline our hypotheses and rel-
evant controls. Specifically, our study focuses on the potential influ-
ence of localized and personal micro-publics and the possibility of par-
tisan-based elite influence. We test our hypotheses by analyzing 
Supreme Court Justice voting on civil liberties cases12 from 1977 to 
 
 10.  See generally Pamela Johnston Conover, The Influence of Group Identifications on Political 
Perception and Evaluation, 46 J. POL. 760 (1984). 
 11.  See, e.g., BAUM, supra note 5. 
 12.  Here, civil liberties cases include five Issue Areas in the U.S. Supreme Court Data-
base, http://scdb.wustl.edu/analysis.php (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). These include criminal pro-
cedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, and privacy cases. Civil liberties cases consti-
tuted a significant portion of the Court’s docket during the time period examined and tend to be 
the most salient and newsworthy matters that the Court handles. Thus, we feel that they are 
especially appropriate in assessing how the Justices may analyze such legal issues in light of the 
milieu of social signals that inform their daily lives. We reserve discussion of other matters that 
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2003 and find encouraging initial support for our theory. Finally, we 
discuss the implications of our findings and suggest useful avenues for 
future research. 
II. Deciding Cases in the Shadow of Public Opinion: 
Who Are the Justices’ Relevant Micro-Publics? 
Traditional studies concerning public opinion and Supreme Court 
decision-making focused on the proposition posed in Mr. Dooley’s 
well-known axiom that “No matter whether th’ constitution follows 
th’ flag or not, th’ supreme coort follows th’ ilicition returns.”13 In es-
sence, the question was whether the Supreme Court works as a majori-
tarian or counter-majoritarian institution. The classic view that the 
Court acts as a counter-majoritarian institution was perhaps most no-
tably challenged by Robert Dahl, who concurred with Mr. Dooley’s 
sentiments and argued that, except for periods of political transition or 
realignment, the High Court was inclined to side with the dominant 
national political alliance and seldom ruled against it to protect minor-
ity interests.14 While some challenged this notion,15 a river of studies 
subsequently emerged that supported Dahl and found a congruence 
between majoritarian public opinion and Supreme Court decision-
making. However, Dahl and his progeny carefully qualified their argu-
ments by noting that any such link between majority opinion and 
Court policy making is likely due to the fact that Presidents and the 
Senate (both of whom have an electoral connection) have historically 
replaced Justices on a fairly regular basis, thus keeping the Court tied 
to majoritarian views.16 While most would not discount the influence 
of judicial selection on Court policy making, there remains the possi-
bility that the Court is also directly responsive to majoritarian opinion, 
 
inhabit the Court’s docket (e.g. antitrust cases) to future research endeavors. 
 13.  Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 6, at 87 (quoting Finley Peter Dunne). 
 14.  See generally Dahl, supra note 7. 
 15.  See, e.g., Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policymaking, 70 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 5066 (1976) (arguing that the Court’s propensity to act independently of domi-
nant political coalition was underestimated). 
 16.  See Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 6, at 88–89. 
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well beyond any congruence already fostered by an electoral connec-
tion via Justice replacement. Mishler and Sheehan17 and Norpoth and 
Segal18 famously debated this issue with neither side emerging as the 
clear winner. However, the majority of subsequent work on this issue 
has come to embrace and support the proposition that national public 
opinion exerts a direct and independent influence on Supreme Court 
Justices’ voting.19 Indeed, in discussing the results of their 1997 study, 
Flemming and Wood acknowledged the well-documented correlation 
between public opinion and Court outcomes and then boldly added 
“[f]ar less obvious and much more controversial has been the possibil-
ity of a direct connection tying the Court and Justices to changes in 
public opinion after appointment. Our analysis settles this contro-
versy.”20 While a few dissenting voices remain on this issue,21 there 
does appear to be near consensus favoring a direct link between ma-
jority national opinion and Court policy making. 
Perhaps less clear or settled in the relevant literature is the actual 
causal mechanism for such an effect. Two primary explanations exist 
for the direct link between public opinion and Court policy making. 
The most dominant rationale is that Justices respond to majority opin-
ion as rational and strategic political actors who seek to maintain public 
legitimacy as a means to facilitate their viability as a policy-making en-
tity (e.g. get their decisions effectively enforced) and to protect their 
autonomy from incursion by other primary political institutions.22  
 
 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See generally Helmut Norpoth & Jeffrey A. Segal, Comment: Popular Influence on Su-
preme Court Decisions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 711 (1994) (providing an invited response to Mishler 
and Sheehan’s article). 
 19.  See, e.g., Kevin T. McGuire & James A. Stimson, The Least Dangerous Branch Revisited: 
New Evidence on Supreme Court Responsiveness to Public Preferences, 66 J. POL. 1018 (2004) (review-
ing the literature and providing additional evidence of direct effect). 
 20.  Roy B. Flemming & Dan B. Wood, The Public and the Supreme Court: Individual Justice 
Responsiveness to American Policy Moods, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 468, 492 (1997). 
 21.  See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 22.  See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 7; FORREST MALTZMAN ET AL., CRAFTING LAW 
ON THE SUPREME COURT: A COLLEGIAL GAME (2000); McGuire & Stimson, supra note 19; 
James A. Stimson et al., Dynamic Representation, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 543 (1995). 
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This “rational anticipation” explanation is well-articulated by Stimson, 
MacKuen, and Erikson: 
[J]ustices who wish to exert authority over the direction of American 
life will anticipate actions of the other branches of government. Fur-
ther, institutionally minded justices will want to avoid public defeat 
and the accompanying weakening of the Court’s implicit authority: 
they will compromise in order to save the institution. All this implies 
paying some attention to what the public wants from government.23 
This rationale also finds some support in the rhetoric of Supreme 
Court Justices. Consider Chief Justice Rehnquist’s closing remarks in 
his 2000 speech on historical threats to the Court’s independence: 
I suspect the Court will continue to encounter challenges to its inde-
pendence and authority by the other branches of government be-
cause of the design of our Constitutional system. The degree to which 
that independence will be preserved will depend again in some measure on 
the public’s respect for the judiciary.24 
Implicit in Rehnquist’s statement is the idea that Court members 
pay careful attention to the winds of public opinion so as to gauge what 
actions might be considered within the realm of those acceptable to 
the populace and therefore not apt to diminish the public’s support for 
the Court and expose it to external threat.25 
The other primary perspective holds that Justices are human deci-
sion makers and, as such, perform their duties much like any other 
 
 23.  See Stimson et al., supra note 22, at 555 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 24.  Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Reflections on the History and Future of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, Speech at the D.C. Circuit Judicial Conference (Jun. 16, 
2000), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeeches.aspx?File-
name=sp_06-16-00.html (emphasis added). 
 25.  McGuire and Stimson seem to agree, stating: 
[A] Court that cares about its perceived legitimacy must rationally anticipate 
whether its preferred outcomes will be respected and faithfully followed by rele-
vant publics. Consequently, a Court that strays too far from the broad boundaries 
imposed by public mood risks having its decisions rejected. Naturally, in individ-
ual cases, the Justices can and do buck the trends of public sentiment. In the 
aggregate, however, popular opinion should still shape the broad contours of ju-
dicial policymaking. 
McGuire & Stimson, supra note 19, at 1019. 
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person who is invariably influenced by the social pressures, interac-
tions, and circumstances that they encounter in their daily lives.26 Per-
haps curiously, Chief Justice Rehnquist lends a view to this perspective 
as well, commenting: 
The judges of any court of last resort, such as the Supreme Court 
of the United States, work in an insulated atmosphere in their 
courthouse where they sit on the bench hearing oral arguments 
or sit in their chambers writing opinions. But these same judges 
go home at night and read the newspapers or watch the evening 
news on television; they talk to their family and friends about 
current events. . . . Judges, so long as they are relatively normal 
human beings, can no more escape being influenced by public 
opinion in the long run than people working at other jobs. In 
addition, if a judge on coming to the bench were to decide to seal 
himself off hermetically from all manifestations of public opin-
ion, he would accomplish very little; he would not be influenced 
by current public opinion, but instead would be influenced by 
the state of public opinion at the time he came to the bench.27 
Thus, this perspective is not necessarily at odds with the attitudinal 
model, except to the extent that some of its proponents argue that Jus-
tices’ attitudes and world views are static rather than evolving and not 
responsive to external factors. This perspective draws upon well-estab-
lished social psychology research to suggest that Justices’ world views 
may change over time in reaction to their personal experiences, relative 
social circumstances, and stimuli.28 Baum believes that this perspective 
is much more plausible than the “rational anticipation” view, arguing 
that members of the Court are unlikely to adjust their voting to protect 
Court legitimacy and viability because the tangible benefits of such ac-
tions are merely speculative and it is unlikely that other actors would  
 
 
 26.  See, BAUM, supra note 5; Flemming & Wood, supra note 20; Michael Giles et al., The 
Supreme Court in American Democracy: Unraveling the Linkages Between Public Opinion and Judicial 
Decision-making, 70 J. POL. 293 (2008); William Mishler & Reginald S. Sheehan, Public Opinion, 
the Attitudinal Model, and Supreme Court Decision-making: A Micro-Analystic Perspective, 58 J. POL. 
169 (1996). 
 27.  See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 751, 768–69 (1986). 
 28.  See BAUM, supra note 5; Giles et al., supra note 26; Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 26. 
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actually threaten the Court due to its strong baseline of diffuse public 
support.29 
Of course, there is no reason to believe that these two explanations 
for direct responsiveness to public opinion are necessarily mutually ex-
clusive. Each mechanism could operate in a way that simultaneously 
has its own impact on Justice behavior. Further, these mechanisms may 
not be as clearly separated from each other as they initially appear. For 
instance, a Justice’s deep caring about how history judges his actions 
on the Court may well overlap, conceptually, with his concern over 
whether the Court is perceived by the public as legitimate. Certainly, 
attempts to parse out the effects of these two causal mechanisms are 
welcomed and some useful insights have already been offered.30 
However, law and courts scholars’ inordinate focus on the effect of 
national-level public opinion, or any singular indicator, on Justices’ 
policy making may obfuscate what is in fact a more complex and nu-
anced dynamic. If Justices act as human decision makers and draw 
upon external concerns in carrying out their duties on the Court, then 
it stands to reason that they may take into account a myriad of social 
cues, beyond national-level public opinion. Further, it is plausible that 
such cues or social references would be of a more proximate or per-
sonal nature than previously considered by the literature. If we assume 
that a Justice’s personal outlook and sense of identity provide a lens 
through which case stimuli (e.g. case facts, case precedent, statutes, 
Constitutional provisions, etc.) are understood, interpreted, and de-
cided, then it is quite reasonable to suggest that social psychology and 
related literatures which seek to explain the development and refine-
ment of personal belief systems and schemas31 would be instructive on 
 
 29.  See BAUM, supra note 5, at 65–67. However, he perhaps too readily focuses on the 
potential actual threat to the Court rather than the Justices’ perception of threat to the Court and 
their perception that their actions can protect it from incursion. In short, perceptions of threat may 
in fact have a stronger influence on behavior than actual threat. 
 30.  See Giles et al., supra note 26. 
 31.  While certainly not an exhaustive explanation, Conover describes schemas in the fol-
lowing manner: 
In general, a ‘schema’ may be defined as a cognitive structure of organized 
prior knowledge, abstracted from experience with specific instances which 
guides the processing of new information and the retrieval of stored infor-
mation. . . . A self-schema may be thought of as the merging or intersection 
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this matter. While outstanding applications of social psychology and 
related approaches to judicial decision-making are to be found,32 they 
are relatively sparse in comparison to legal, attitudinal, or strategic ap-
proaches and are extremely rare in the context of studies on the U.S. 
Supreme Court.33 In the next section we investigate the possibility that 
group identity dynamics may provide leverage on understanding how 
Justices make sense of the cases that come before them and arrive at 
their legal decisions. More specifically, we posit that we can gain in-
sight on Justices’ case voting behavior by identifying and exploring the 
social groups (micro-publics) they may identify with in constructing 
their belief systems or schemas. This, in turn, should provide us with 
a more nuanced understanding of the lens through which Justices as-
semble, interpret, and process case stimuli in making their legal 
choices. 
III. Approach and Research Design 
In thinking about the micro-publics that might help shape a Jus-
tice’s world view and perhaps his or her case voting, we might consider 
what types of group identity information we would examine in a situ-
ation in which we had complete access to the Justices’ lives. In this 
unrealistic scenario, we might survey a Justice’s significant other, ex-
tended family, friends, groups in which he or she is a member (e.g. 
alumni associations, civic or professional clubs, etc.), and other people 
 
of two bodies of knowledge: information about the stimuli in some domain 
and knowledge of one’s self. . . .  
Conover, supra note 10, at 762 (citations omitted). 
 32.  See Jilda Aliotta, Social Backgrounds, Social Motives and Participation on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 267 (1988); Burton Atkins et al., Personality Theory and Judging: A Proposed 
Theory of Self Esteem and Judicial Policy-Making, 2 L. & POL’Y Q. 189 (1980); James Gibson, Envi-
ronmental Constraints on the Behavior of Judges: A Representational Model of Judicial Decision-making, 
14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 343 (1980); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 777 (2001). 
 33.  The lack of psychology-based studies on the U.S. Supreme Court Justices is no doubt 
due, at least in part, to the fact that such studies typically rely upon interviews or surveys which 
are difficult to obtain with regard to the High Court’s members. One psychology-based study 
that did analyze U.S. Supreme Court Justice behavior used content analysis of Supreme Court 
nominees’ confirmation statements to help provide a psychologically oriented explanation of Jus-
tices’ voting behavior and opinion writing after ascending the Court. See Aliotta, supra note 32. 
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with whom the Justice interacts with or turns to for information on a 
regular basis. The basic idea would be that by gaining such insight on 
a Justice’s social environment and group identities, we could more 
closely scrutinize the Justice’s “times” or set of relevant social reference 
points. Unfortunately, this scenario is not realistic. Accordingly, we 
endeavor to find and examine more feasible proxies for a Justice’s social 
environment and relevant micro-publics. We focus on three core path-
ways of micro-public influence: personal-social influences, local work 
environment influences, and elite-partisan cues. We outline each of 
these core concerns and their related hypotheses in the paragraphs that 
follow and then discuss relevant controls. 
As indicated in the first section of this paper, our dependent varia-
ble is simply a Justice’s vote in civil liberties cases (1 = liberal outcome; 
0 = conservative). We examine the Court’s terms from 1977 to 200334 
and focus on fully argued cases. 
A. Personal-Social Influences 
All Justices come from somewhere. They leave established jobs and 
social circles to begin work and life anew on the High Court in the 
nation’s capital. It is difficult to conceive that the Justices’ split with 
their former residences is complete and total. Indeed, many Justices 
retain firm ties with their home state and spend significant time there 
when the Court is not in session. Could these social environment ties 
cast an influence on Justice voting? Tate’s seminal work on Justices’ 
voting and social backgrounds found the region of Justices’ birth to be 
an important consideration in explaining Justices’ lifetime voting pro-
pensities in civil liberties cases.35 He later found regional background 
to be a significant determinant of judicial voting on the Canadian High 
Court.36 On a more general level, political behavior scholars have long 
 
 34.  The temporal limits of our study are largely constrained by the availability of certain 
measures we use in constructing some of our independent variables (e.g. Wright’s measure of 
state citizen ideology. Gerald C. Wright et al., Aggregated CBS News/New York Times National 
Polls, http://php.indiana.edu/~wright1/cbs7603_pct.zip (last visited Nov. 23, 2013)). 
 35.  See generally C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 355 (1981). 
 36.  See generally C. Neal Tate & Panu Sittiwong, Decision-making in the Canadian Supreme 
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held that social and political environments, groups, and networks help 
to shape citizens’ attitudes and views.37 There is also some evidence to 
suggest that political elites take attitudinal cues from home state envi-
ronments in framing their own positions on policy issues. For instance, 
Layman and Carsey38 found that shifts in the home state ideological 
environment of national political party activists influenced the devel-
opment and evolution of their positions on abortion policy.39 
We believe that Justices’ world views may be influenced by the so-
cial mores of their home state on a continual basis and that this influ-
ence could reveal itself in their case voting. We measure home state 
ideology using Gerald Wright’s annual data on state citizens’ self-iden-
tification of their ideological orientation (liberal, conservative, or mod-
erate).40 In constructing this measure we subtract the percentage of 
state residents identifying themselves as conservative from the per-
centage identifying themselves as liberal to produce a “net liberal per-
centage” score for a given year. Justices’ designated home state is that 
identified as their residence at the time of their confirmation.41 
Of course it is also possible that Justices take cues from elite home 
state political actors. Indeed, Baum and Devins argue that Justices are 
more likely to consider political elites as their relevant ‘audience’ in 
 
Court: Extending the Personal Attributes Model Across Nations, 51 J. POL. 900 (1989). 
 37.  See, e.g., Robert D. Putnam, Political Attitudes and the Local Community, 60 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 640 (1966); Robert Huckfeldt & John Sprague, Networks in Context: The Social Flow of 
Political Information, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1197 (1987). 
 38.  See generally Geoffrey C. Layman & Thomas M. Carsey, Why Do Party Activists Con-
vert? An Analysis of Individual-Level Change on the Abortion Issue, 51 POL. RES. Q. 723 (1998). 
 39.  In another study, Jackson and Carsey demonstrate that citizens’ voting in presidential 
elections is also influenced by group identity concerns, specifically the voter’s state political en-
vironment. This finding suggests that theories of citizen voting in national elections are well 
advised to consider the geopolitical context of citizen voting behavior in such situations. See gen-
erally Robert Jackson & Thomas Carsey, Group Components of U.S. Presidential Voting Across the 
States, 21 POL. BEHAV. 123 (1999). 
 40.  See generally Robert S. Erikson, Gerald C. Wright & John P. McIver, Public Opinion 
in the States: A Quarter Century of Change and Stability in JEFFREY COHEN, ED., PUBLIC OPINION 
IN STATE POLITICS (2006), 229–53. 
 41.  Justices’ home state information was drawn from Lee Epstein’s data set on U.S. Su-
preme Court Justices’ background information. See http://epstein.usc.edu/research/jus-
ticesdata.html. 
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constructing their sense of identity and world views.42 Accordingly, we 
consider this possibility by incorporating the well-known and oft-used 
measure of ideology for state political elite institutional actors pro-
duced by Berry and his associates.43 Certainly, Justices will vary in the 
degree of their identification with their home state, but, on balance, it 
is likely that most Justices draw important information from these 
home state environments. Thus, we hypothesize: 
H1: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is positively associated 
with the liberalism of his or her home state’s citizens. 
H2: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is positively associated 
with the liberalism of his or her home state’s elite political actors. 
B. Local Work Environment Influences 
While Justices may turn to different areas of the country in con-
structing and maintaining their personal lives, extended social net-
works, and family ties, they all work in Washington, D.C. In a city in 
which the elite makers of national policy roam the sidewalks and 21% 
of the population possesses a graduate or professional degree,44 it is 
plausible to propose that the Justices’ daily working environment is 
distinguishable from the rest of the country. As Baum explains, some 
conservative critics of the Court’s policy making have claimed that Jus-
tices are swayed by the liberal east coast environment in which they 
work and that they tend left in their decision-making over time to gain 
favor with the political, media, and social elites who shape the direction 
of Washington, D.C. thinking. Indeed, even Justice Scalia has voiced 
 
 42.  See generally Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Why the Supreme Court Cares About 
Elites, Not the American People, 98 GEO. L.J. 1515 (2010). 
 43.  See generally William Berry et al., Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the 
American States, 1960–1993, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 327 (1998) (using interest groups’ ratings of 
states’ members of Congress to infer state citizenry and elite ideology); William Berry et al., 
Measuring Citizen and Government Ideology in the U.S. States: A Re-appraisal, 10 ST. POL. & POL’Y 
Q. 117 (2010) (updating authors’ original measure). 
 44.  See Washington, District of Columbia, CITY-DATA.COM, http://www.city-
data.com/city/Washington-District-of-Columbia.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2013). This level of 
advanced education is double that of comparable large cities such as Chicago, Illinois (10%) or 
Los Angeles, California (9%). 
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such concerns. This phenomenon is sometimes termed “the Green-
house Effect” after one of the nation’s most well-known journalistic 
commentators on the Court, Linda Greenhouse.45 Certainly, it is a de-
cidedly liberal environment—Wright’s ideology scores indicate that 
no state has a more liberal citizenry than the nation’s capital. On the 
other hand, like many states, its citizens do exhibit interesting variation 
in their degree of liberalness over time.46 We measure this variable sim-
ilar to our variable for personal social influences (“home state”) and 
provide a “net liberal” score from Wright’s data. We hypothesize: 
H3: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is positively associated 
with the relative liberalism of their working environment (Washington, 
D.C.). 
Of course, it is important to consider not just the political environ-
ment of Washington, but also the degree to which Justices may have 
come to acclimate to the milieu of its distinct social environs (relative 
to where they came from). Thus, in an ideal situation we would want 
to know how strong Justices’ ties are to their home state and the degree 
to which they work to maintain those ties (relative to the potential in-
fluence of their new surroundings). Justices may have solidified social 
networks (in their home state) within a short period of time while liv-
ing there, but others may require a longer time (or may have never 
developed very strong social ties and identities). In similar fashion, 
some Justices may make frequent trips back to their former state of 
residence and some may keep communications with former friends and 
colleagues more up to date—certainly, advances in communication 
technology and the advent of social media opportunities makes this an 
even more complex situation. Of course, operationalizing such a varied 
and difficult-to-measure set of related phenomena is problematic to 
say the least. 
 
 45.  See BAUM, supra note 5, at 149–51. In some exploratory analysis Baum finds that Re-
publican D.C. newcomers do, in fact, tend to drift left more than Republican Justices who were 
already based in D.C. or Democrats (generally), although he cautions that these findings do not 
rule out alternative explanations for such drift. 
 46.  For instance, the percentage of self-identified liberals in the District of Columbia 
ranges from a low of 16.7 (in 1978) to a high of 54.5 (in 2000). Similar fluctuations can be found 
in our constructed “net liberal” score although they are less intuitive. See Erikson, et al. supra 
note 40. 
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However, we do wish to address this concern over competing in-
fluences between Washington and Justices’ home states’ environs and 
accordingly have constructed a measure that indicates the number of 
years that a Justice has been on the Court, presumably attenuating 
their ties to their home state through the passage of time in a distant 
location (Washington, D.C.). However, recall that Washington, D.C. 
is a distinctly liberal environment (relative to all U.S. states). Thus, 
incorporating this measure allows us to shed additional light on the 
fabled “Greenhouse Effect,” which suggests that Justices grow increas-
ingly liberal over their tenure in D.C. Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
H4: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is positively associated 
with the number of years the Justice has spent working in Washington, D.C. 
C. Elite Partisan Cues 
If we consider Justices of the Supreme Court to be, in essence, hu-
man decision makers who see case facts and law through a lens of their 
personal belief systems, then we can draw important information from 
general political behavior based theories of how citizens’ world views 
or policy attitudes are developed and adjusted. Two dominant theories 
seek to explain the relationship between partisanship and policy pref-
erences: the party conversion thesis and issue conversion. The party 
conversion thesis put forward by Fiorina47 among others, and more re-
cently revised by Achen48 through a Bayesian updating model is not 
readily applicable to a model of Supreme Court Justices since they do 
not exhibit changes in partisanship (at least in the span of time that we 
examine). Issue conversion, however, may provide at least one alterna-
tive account of dynamic policy preferences linked to membership in a 
political party. Green and Palmquist49 and Green, Palmquist, and 
 
 47.  See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections 
(1981); Morris P. Fiorina, Parties and Partisanship: A 40-Year Retrospective, 24 POL. BEHAV. 93 
(2002). 
 48.  See generally Christopher H. Achen, Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear 
Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research, 14 POL. BEHAV. 195 (1992). 
 49.  See generally Donald P. Green & Bradley Palmquist, Of Artifacts and Partisan Instabil-
ity, 34 AM. J. POL. SCI. 872 (1990); Donald P. Green & Bradley Palmquist, How Stable is Party 
Identification?, 16 POL. BEHAV. 437 (1994). 
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Schickler50 offer some of the most compelling evidence for issue con-
version—the theory that individuals respond to ideological shifts 
within their party by updating their own policy preferences.51 This the-
ory suggests that Justices, like other citizens, update their views in re-
sponse to ideological shifts within their chosen party. This is because, 
like most individuals, their identity with the party constitutes an im-
portant component of who they are and how they perceive themselves 
and the world. Accordingly, we believe that Justices’ views on policy 
may be affected by cues or signals of party ideological shifts as deter-
mined by partisan elites. Such adjustments in their policy attitudes 
should be reflected in their case voting. We measure partisan cues or 
changes in party ideology by examining how they are documented in 
party platforms. Budge et al. provide political party policy ideology es-
timates for twenty-five countries, including the United States.52 They 
use content analysis of major parties’ executive election platforms 
(manifestos) to determine parties’ overall ideological standing across a 
wide range of policy issues. For the United States, these estimates are 
based on Democratic and Republican party platforms set forth in pres-
idential election year platforms, with higher scores denoting more 
conservative stances and lower scores more liberal views. It is plausible 
that intraparty change in ideology does not occur rapidly at only the 
time immediately preceding the drafting of the party platform. Rather, 
it is likely that such changes occur continually and are merely docu-
mented during presidential election years. Accordingly, we interpolate 
these scores to provide yearly estimates. Further, we are primarily in-
terested in intraparty variance over time (as opposed to differences be-
tween the parties) and therefore assess these estimates as changes, or 
 
 50.  See generally DONALD P. GREEN ET AL., PARTISAN HEARTS AND MINDS: POLITICAL 
PARTIES AND THE SOCIAL IDENTITIES OF VOTERS (2002). 
 51.  See also Thomas M. Carsey & Geoffrey C. Layman, Changing Sides or Changing Minds? 
Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate, 50 AM. J. POL. SCI. 464 (2006) 
(finding that party influence on individuals’ preferences turns on awareness of partisan differences 
and issue salience). 
 52.  See generally IAN BUDGE ET AL., MAPPING POLICY PREFERENCES: ESTIMATES FOR 
PARTIES, ELECTORS, AND GOVERNMENTS 1945–1998 (2001) (providing original measure); 
HANS-DIETER KLINGEMANN ET AL., MAPPING POLICY PREFERENCES II: ESTIMATES FOR 
PARTIES, ELECTORS, AND GOVERNMENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, EUROPEAN UNION AND 
OECD 1990–2003 (2006) (updating the measure). 
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first differences, rather than levels. We argue that changes in a Justice’s 
party’s ideology have an influence on their world view and policy atti-
tudes and, therefore, are reflected in their case decision-making. We 
hypothesize: 
H5: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is negatively associated 
with conservative shifts in his or her party’s ideology as reflected in executive 
partisan political platforms (manifestos). 
However, a Justice’s partisan identity may be informed and af-
fected by varied and distinct elite signals and presidential party plat-
form manifestos provide just one avenue of potential policy signaling. 
Justices may also come to form their partisan identity and outlook 
through information emanating from party actors who serve in Con-
gress. In order to provide a measure of the respective party preferences 
in Congress we consider those of the median member of the House of 
Representatives of the Justices’ chosen party.53 To determine these 
measurement values we utilize the well-known Poole and Rosenthal’s 
DW-NOMINATE first dimension scores.54 These scores are based on 
past roll call votes with spatial dimensions estimated by differences be-
tween lawmakers. Any individual score represents the ideological 
placement of a member of Congress in relation to all other members 
of Congress.55 As with our party platform manifestos measure, our fo-
cus here is on intraparty variance in the House of Representatives over 
time (as opposed to party differences) and therefore we assess these 
 
 53.  See Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Does Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? 
Possibly Yes, (But We’re Not Sure Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263 (2010) (utilizing this approach 
in assessing congressional influence on U.S. Supreme Court Justice voting). 
 54.  See Keith Poole & Jeffrey B. Lewis, Measuring Bias and Uncertainty in Ideal Point Esti-
mates via the Parametric Bootstrap, 12 POL. ANALYSIS 105 (2004); Keith Poole et al., Measuring 
Bias and Uncertainty in DW-Nominate, 17 POL. ANALYSIS 261 (2009). See 
http://voteview.com/dwnomin.htm for further details on common space and procedural issues. 
 55.  Again, this calculation was done for the first dimension of the DW-NOMINATE 
score. Generally, the first dimension is considered to be more reflective of legislator preferences 
with occasional historical periods when multiple issue spaces dictate multi-dimensionality (see 
also Epstein & Martin, supra note 53, for judicial politics application). Traditionally, multiple 
dimension analysis is appropriate only in studies involving the years 1829–1851 and 1937–1970. 
Keith Poole, The Decline and Rise of Party Polarization in Congress During the Twentieth Century, 
EXTENSIONS, Fall 2005, at 1. Because this paper falls outside these periods, we use only the first 
dimension in our analysis. 
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estimates as changes, or first differences, rather than levels.56 
H6: A Justice’s probability of casting a liberal vote is negatively associated 
with conservative shifts in his or her party’s ideology as reflected in the ideo-
logical positions of members of the Justice’s party in Congress. 
D. Relevant controls 
Of course, a number of other concerns must be taken into account 
in an explanation of Justice voting. Of primary concern are the ideo-
logical inclinations that the Justices hold when they begin their tenure 
on the Court. If, as some argue, Justices’ policy attitudes are largely 
static or stable, then we might expect that the contemporary external 
influences on Justice’s world views would have no effect on Justices’ 
voting. In order to control for this possibility, we include as an im-
portant control, the well-known measures of Justices’ ideology (at the 
time they ascend the High Bench) initially developed by Segal and 
Cover.57 These scores are based on newspaper op-ed writers’ assess-
ment of nominees’ ideological orientations during the time between 
the nominees’ nomination and confirmation. 
Another important consideration that must be accounted for is the 
possibility that Justices are simply reacting to national public opinion 
in their voting. As previously discussed, the vast majority of studies as-
sessing the relationship between public opinion and Justice decision-
making have considered this influence on the Justices as essentially a 
singular entity—there is one national opinion and it affects all Justices 
in the same manner. Specifically, these studies have used Stimson’s 
 
 56.  The model findings remain robust when using a similar measure for the Senate. Using 
the House provides us the ability to finely measure changes in legislative policy mood due to the 
shorter electoral cycle. Given that the time period we study represents a period of partisan rea-
lignment, the general partisan responsiveness of the House is useful in our analysis. This usage 
and procedure falls in line with the suggested use established by Poole and Rosenthal in KEITH 
POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL 
CALL VOTING (1997) and KEITH POOLE, SPATIAL MODELS OF PARLIAMENTARY VOTING 
(2005). 
 57.  See generally Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of the 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557 (1989) (finding that the scores explain the 
vast majority of the variance in Justices’ lifetime voting records). 
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composite index of national liberalism.58 This measure aggregates na-
tional level surveys on a wide range of issues to provide a single indi-
cator of national policy mood. We include this measure as an im-
portant control and do not make the case that it is not a relevant source 
of policy information that Justices may consider—just that it is not the 
only one.59 
We also wish to account for the possibility that a Justice’s case vot-
ing might be influenced by the Court’s certiorari agenda and/or the 
effects of the general policy-making climate of the Court’s cumulative 
personnel (e.g. case content). Since our dependent variable is dichoto-
mous we cannot adjust the dependent variable to account for this con-
cern as some have suggested.60 Accordingly, we adopt the method used 
by Mishler and Sheehan61 and others and include in our model speci-
fication the mean ideology score for the Court for the term using the 
aforementioned Segal/Cover scores. 
Finally, we consider the generally accepted precept that the Court 
tends to take on cases for review that it wishes to reverse. We include 
a dichotomous variable to indicate those cases in which the party ap-
pealing the case to the Supreme Court (the petitioner) is advocating a 
liberal position.62 We also note here that our primary hypotheses var-
iables are measured on calendar years and therefore involve a nine 
 
 
 58.  See JAMES A. STIMSON, UPDATED FROM PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA: MOODS, 
CYCLES, AND SWINGS, (2d ed. 1999). Updated scores retrieved from James A. Stimson, 
UNC.EDU, http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/ (last visited Sept. 7, 2013). 
 59.  While the Stimson composite index is the measure most frequently used in such stud-
ies, we recognize that some may be concerned that a similar, yet discrete, measure of national 
ideology might also warrant consideration and also another variable to assess this proposition. 
Stimson’s national ideology measure provides an index of our nation’s citizens’ ideological self-
identification (see Data Files, UNC.EDU, http://www.unc.edu/~jstimson/Data.html (last visited 
Sept. 23, 2013)). Auxiliary analysis suggests that these measures (national policy mood and na-
tional ideological self-identification) represent distinct depictions of national opinion and the 
variance inflation factor diagnostics do not indicate problematic collinearity when both are used 
together in the model. 
 60.  See Lawrence Baum, Measuring Policy Change in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 905 (1988). 
 61.  See Mishler & Sheehan, supra note 6. 
 62.  Descriptive statistics for all variables used can be found in Table A1 of the Appendix. 
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month (or more) lag to the beginning of the Court’s term in October 
when it begins hearing and deciding cases.63 
IV. Results 
Table 1 displays the findings for our logistic regression model of 
Justice voting behavior in civil liberties cases. We employ robust stand-
ard errors clustered on the individual court case. The model performs 
admirably on prediction (compared to the modal category), yielding a 
40.4% reduction of error.64 More importantly, the individual variable 
coefficients provide intriguing results.65 First, the coefficients for Jus-
tices’ personal social influences—home state (institutions-elite) and 
home state (citizens)—are statistically significant and in the predicted 
direction, providing support for our hypothesis. The coefficients for 
elite partisan cues (party platforms and Congress) are also significant 
and in the predicted direction. While the local working environment 
variable (relative D.C. liberalism) does not yield a statistically signifi-
cant finding, the Justice’s time on the Court in the D.C. beltway is 
significantly associated with liberal voting. Thus, the latter finding 
suggests that the fabled “Greenhouse Effect,” as assessed in this study, 
may cast some influence on Justices’ voting. Table 2 demonstrates the 
impact of the statistically significant micro-public variables on Justices’ 
voting. We see that the relative impact for a Justice’s time working in 
Washington, D.C. is more pronounced than the more modest but still 
substantively meaningful effects of home state influences or elite par-
tisan influences. Taken in tandem (e.g. simultaneous movements in 
 
 63.  We also incorporate state indicator (dummy) variables to control for all state-level 
cross-sectional variation, thus restricting the model to explaining within-state home environment 
effects on distal judicial actors. Thus, our state citizen ideology effect (discussed infra notes 42–
43 and accompanying text) can be interpreted as the effect of a one unit increase in citizen liber-
alism within a (home) state on the probability of a Justice voting in a liberal direction on a case. 
The same holds true for the effect that we find for our measure of state elite actor liberalism on 
Justice voting (discussed infra notes 45–46 and accompanying text). 
 64.  Auxiliary analysis of variance inflation factors indicates that multicollinearity is not 
problematic for this model. 
 65.  The indicator (dummy) variables for Justices’ home states are not displayed. These 
results are available from the authors upon request. 
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multiple micro-publics), we could envision a scenario in which the cu-
mulative potential impact of home state social cues and elite partisan 
signals on Justice voting could in fact be rather substantial. 
In sum, our results indicate that there is good reason to believe that 
Justice voting, and Supreme Court policy making, are tied to Justices’ 
relevant micro-publics in important and interesting ways. Our results 
may also provide some insight on the question of the relationship be-
tween external (i.e. non-legal or attitudinal) concerns such as public 
opinion and Justice voting. We find that Justices’ personal social 
(home state) and partisan ties are associated with their voting behavior, 
but find little support for a national level public opinion effect. Of 
course, we do not suggest that such an effect is not viable, just that we 
do not find it here. Similarly, while we do not endeavor a full assess-
ment of the institutional threat versus personal social mechanism ques-
tion, we do suggest that it is unlikely that Justices feel that their insti-
tution’s viability or independence is hurt or helped by case voting that 
is congruent with the micro-publics that we find to be associated with 
voting outcomes (e.g. Justices’ home state citizens). It is more likely 
that their votes are tied to these forces in the same way that we might 
witness such a relationship in ordinary citizens’ life decisions—these 
information sets may inform their world view and perhaps help define 
their social identity. 
V. Conclusion 
Indeed, many of the questions that we seek to answer regarding 
judicial behavior and our approaches to those questions may be in-
formed by thinking about how Justices make decisions in light of how 
all citizens make important choices in their professional and personal 
lives.66 As Justice Scalia once commented, “it’s a little unrealistic to talk 
about the Court as though it’s a continuous, unchanging institution 
 
 66.  To be sure, scholars of political behavior have found important and interesting dif-
ferences in the behavior of elites and non-elites as well as those who possess high levels and low 
levels of relevant information (See, e.g., J. R. HIBBING & E. THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH 
DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS’ BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENTS SHOULD WORK (2002)). 
We only argue that Supreme Court Justices are, at bottom line, human decision makers and as 
such are susceptible, at some level, to many of things that may influence all people in making 
important decisions. 
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rather than to some extent necessarily a reflection of the society in 
which it functions.”67 Certainly, the tendency of Supreme Court Jus-
tices to drift from early decision-making patterns to unanticipated ju-
risprudence has vexed both the Presidents who appoint them and the 
scholars who study them. While academics have done an excellent job 
of documenting and tracking Justice drift,68 they have perhaps been 
less successful at explaining or predicting it. Why does Justice drift 
elude us? Hanson and Benforado suggest that an underlying problem 
may be with the way we conceptualize and approach explaining human 
behavior more generally.69 They argue that in attempting to explain 
human behavior (and more specifically Justices’ voting behavior and 
drift) we tend to overstate the degree to which dispositional factors 
(e.g. attitudes, choice, strategy, and will) drive behavior and underesti-
mate the influences of situational and contextual concerns, such as en-
vironment and subconscious processes. 
Thus, attempts to explain and predict Justice behavior by focusing 
on their innate and unswerving sincere ideological preferences or their 
strategic attempts to consciously promote those preferences may be 
missing an important consideration: that Justices, at some level, may 
not completely willfully dictate their behaviors or their views toward 
certain objects, laws, or other phenomena.70 Rather, they may be in-
fluenced in important ways by situation and circumstance—the milieu 
of events, stimuli, and social interactions that define their daily lives, 
indeed, “the times” in which they live. Further, it may turn on the mi-
cro-publics from which they glean personal meaning and social iden-
tity. To be sure, we must be careful in considering possible causal 
mechanisms suggested by the relationship between micro-publics and 
Justices’ voting. At this juncture it is difficult to parse whether Justices 
are reacting directly to micro-publics or if micro-publics merely reflect 
 
 67.  McGuire & Stimson, supra note 19, at 1020. 
 68.  See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Buyer Beware? Presidential Success Through Supreme 
Court Appointments, 53 POL. RES. Q. 557 (2000) (assessing Justices’ drift from the ideology of 
their appointing President). 
 69.  See generally Jon Hanson & Adam Benforado, The Drifters: Why the Supreme Court 
Makes Justices More Liberal, 31 BOSTON REV. 23 (2006). 
 70.  See generally John Irwin & Daniel Real, Unconscious Influence in Judicial Decision-Mak-
ing: The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1 (2010). 
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the underlying common stimuli of shared events and conditions that 
influence them as well as Justices who are similarly processing such 
information and the emotional nuances of the human experience. Still, 
our empirical findings provide intriguing insight on how these cur-
rents run and reveal themselves. Thus, the findings of our study may 
have important implications for studies of Supreme Court Justice vot-
ing that focus solely or primarily on Justices’ conscious goal-directed 
or strategic behavior, to the exclusion of situational or personal envi-
ronmental considerations.71 
In coming to grips with the potential value of micro-publics and 
Justices’ “times” in helping to understand Justices’ voting, there are a 
good number of remaining questions for future research. These in-
clude alternate micro-publics such as media, competing elite cues, and 
professional organizations, among others. Further, Justices may pro-
cess such micro-publics differentially, depending on their background 
or other personal characteristics. We have investigated here only a 
handful of such explanations and future research will undoubtedly find 
more that are worthy of examination. 
 
 71.  See, e.g., DOES CONSCIOUSNESS CAUSE BEHAVIOR? (Susan Pockett et al. eds., 2006). 
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Table 1 – Logistic Regression Results for Justice Votes 
in Civil Liberties Cases – Likelihood of a Liberal Vote 
Variable Coefficient Odds Ratio Robust S.E. t-score 
Home State Liberalism  
(institutions - elite) 
 
  .00304* 1.00304 0.00162 1.87 
Justice Party Conservatism  
Change (Congress) 
 
  -4.76731** 0.00850 2.33717 -2.04 
Justice Time in DC 
 
  .014626** 1.01473 0.00426 3.43 
DC Liberalism 
 
  -0.00092 0.99908 0.00183 -0.50 
Home State Liberalism  
(citizen) 
 
  .00528* 1.00529 0.00301 1.75 
Justice Party Conservat- 
ism Change (party platform) 
 
  -.03968** 0.96110 0.01284 -3.09 
National Public  
Liberalism (policy mood) 
 
  -0.00015 0.99985 0.01369 -0.01 
National Public Liberal- 
ism (self identification) 
 
  0.02054 1.02076 0.02256 0.91 
Justice Liberalism  
(Segal Cover score) 
 
  2.44214** 11.49760 0.12720 19.20 
Court Liberalism  
(mean Segal Cover score) 
 
  -2.35341** 0.09504 0.93224 -2.52 
Petitioner brings liberal  
Case to Court 
 
  .95157** 2.58977 0.07868 12.09 
Constant  -1.24685  0.97729 -1.28 
N = 1437 
*P<.05, **P<.01 
Robust standard errors are clustered on case citation.  
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Table 2 – Probability Impact of Micro-Publics on 
Justices’ Liberal Voting* 
 






Home state liberalism  
(institutions – elite)(+) 
 
0.408 0.440 0.476 
Home state liberalism  
(citizens)(+) 
 
0.413 0.443 0.480 
Justice Party conservatism  
change (congress)(-) 
0.483 0.437 0.391 
Justice party conservatism  
change (party platform)(-) 
0.481 0.443 0.403 
Justice time in DC (+) 0.395 0.442 0.512 
 
* Marginal effects for a specific variable are computed while holding other binary variables 
at their modal values and other continuous variables at their mean values. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1 – Variable Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Liberal vote 0.47877 0.49956 0 1 
Home state liberalism (institutions – elite) 49.47224 22.23969 1.25 92.51428 
Justice party conservatism (congress) 0.00552 0.01239 -0.033 0.046 
Justice time in DC 14.47264 7.72507 1 33 
DC liberalism -0.49403 23.5224 -47 41 
Home state liberalism (citizen) -11.67462 8.24225 -34.8 16 
Justice party conservatism (party platform) 0.85729 2.07970 -3.09412 4.8275 
National public liberalism (policy mood) 56.54668 3.42873 50.854 62.47 
National public liberalism (self-identification) 35.48501 1.91292 31.838 38.95 
Justice liberalism (Segal Cover score) 0.36824 0.31642 0 1 
Court liberalism (mean Segal Cover score) 0.36712 0.06237 0.24167 0.43778 
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